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Brain Activity in Valuation Regions While Thinking About the Future
Predicts Individual Discount Rates
Abstract
People vary widely in how much they discount delayed rewards, yet little is known about the sources of these
differences. Here we demonstrate that neural activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and ventral
striatum (VS) when human subjects are asked to merely think about the future—specifically, to judge the
subjective length of future time intervals—predicts delay discounting. High discounters showed lower activity
for longer time delays, while low discounters showed the opposite pattern. Our results demonstrate that the
correlation between VMPFC and VS activity and discounting occurs even in the absence of choices about
future rewards, and does not depend on a person explicitly evaluating future outcomes or judging their self-
relevance. This suggests a link between discounting and basic processes involved in thinking about the future,
such as temporal perception. Our results also suggest that reducing impatience requires not suppression of
VMPFC and VS activity altogether, but rather modulation of how these regions respond to the present versus
the future.
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Brain Activity in Valuation Regions while Thinking about the
Future Predicts Individual Discount Rates
Nicole Cooper,1 JosephW. Kable,1 B. Kyu Kim,3 and Gal Zauberman2
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People vary widely in how much they discount delayed rewards, yet little is known about the sources of these differences. Here we
demonstrate that neural activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and ventral striatum (VS) when human subjects are asked
to merely think about the future—specifically, to judge the subjective length of future time intervals—predicts delay discounting. High
discounters showed lower activity for longer time delays, while low discounters showed the opposite pattern. Our results demonstrate
that the correlationbetweenVMPFCandVSactivity anddiscountingoccurs even in the absenceof choices about future rewards, anddoes
not depend on a person explicitly evaluating future outcomes or judging their self-relevance. This suggests a link between discounting
andbasic processes involved in thinking about the future, such as temporal perception. Our results also suggest that reducing impatience
requires not suppression of VMPFC andVS activity altogether, but rathermodulation of how these regions respond to the present versus
the future.
Introduction
People differ in their willingness to defer immediate gratification
to pursue long-term goals. These individual differences are im-
portant, because a tendency to delay gratification is associated
with better educational outcomes in children and beneficial
health behaviors in adults (Mischel et al., 1988; Bickel and
Marsch, 2001; Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Chabris et al.,
2008). However, we know little about the source of these differ-
ences. This article links individual differences in delay discount-
ing to brain activity while individuals are merely thinking about
future durations, in the absence of any explicit tradeoffs between
immediate and delayed gratification.
Delay discounting tasks provide a measure of preference
for immediate versus delayed rewards. The extent of prefer-
ence for immediate rewards is captured by the discount rate,
which expresses how much the subjective value of a delayed
reward declines as a function of delay. Neuroimaging studies
of discounting have found that BOLD activity in ventral stria-
tum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) scales
with the subjective value of the options being considered
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Ballard and Knutson, 2009;
Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009; Pine et al., 2009). This implies that
individual differences in discounting are linked to differences
in the neural sensitivities of VS and VMPFC. In high discount-
ers, there is much greater activity in these regions for imme-
diate compared with equally sized delayed rewards, while this
difference is smaller in low discounters. Contextual manipu-
lations that shift discount rates within an individual may in-
volve the same mechanism, affecting BOLD activity within VS
and VMPFC (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010a).
More recent work has suggested a link between discounting
and VS or VMPFC activity in other task contexts. Hariri et al.
(2006) have shown that higher discounters exhibit a greater VS
response to unpredicted rewards. Others have shown that higher
discounters exhibit a greater difference in BOLD activity between
judgments of oneself in the present compared with the future
(Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2011).
A more basic question is whether brain activity when indi-
viduals are merely prompted to think about the future can
predict discount rates. Is there a relationship between VS and
VMPFC activity and discount rates even when individuals are
not explicitly evaluating present or future outcomes or judg-
ing their self-relevance? Behavioral studies have recently dem-
onstrated the role of time perception in intertemporal choice
(Kim and Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman et al., 2009), but, to
date, there are no neuroimaging data on this relationship.
Here we show that the delay sensitivity of VS and VMPFC
BOLD responses when individuals make simple value-free
judgments about the subjective length of future time intervals
predicts behavioral discount rates measured 10 d later. This
suggests that the association between neural activity and dis-
counting arises from a basic process involved in thinking
about the future, such as judging temporal distance. Addition-
ally, our results suggest that reducing impatience requires not
suppressing VS and VMPFC activity altogether, but rather
modulating how these regions respond to the present versus
the future.
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Materials andMethods
Subjects. Forty participants (16 males and 24 females; 88% were right
handed) were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania and sur-
rounding community. Participants had a mean age of 21.75 years (SD,
3.27 years). All participants were compensated for their time on both of 2
testing days and received an additionalmonetary payment based on their
decisions in the discounting task. All participants provided consent in
accordance with the procedures of the Institutional Review Board of the
University of Pennsylvania.
Tasks.All participants completed two sessions, separated by an average
of 10 d (SD, 5 d; range, 4–21 d). Participants were told that there were
two sessions involving different tasks, but theywere not told the details of
each task until that session began. In the first session, participants com-
pleted the temporal judgment task (Fig. 1A). In this task, participants
were asked to judge the subjective duration of a future delay interval on a
visual analog scale. This scale was bounded by the labels “very short” and
“very long” (Zauberman et al., 2009). Participants were asked questions
of the form, “How long do you consider the duration between today and
a day in 28 d?” In each scan, participants were asked about 26 different
delay durations, uniformly distributed between 14 and 364 d. Partici-
pants were informed beforehand about the entire range of delays they
would be judging. Participants entered their judgment by moving the
response bar along the scale. The response bar always appeared in the
middle of the scale. Participants used two buttons to move the bar to
the right and left, and a third to submit their response. Ratings were
recorded in arbitrary screen units, ranging from 1 to 165. All participants
completed four scans of this task.
In the second session, participants completed the temporal discount-
ing task (Fig. 1C). In this task, participants bid on delayed monetary
rewards. They provided the amount of money received immediately that
they felt was equivalent to receiving a larger amount after a specified
delay. Participants were asked questions of the form, “I feel indifferent
between receiving $75 in 28 d and receiving $? now.” From trial to trial,
the $75 value of the delayed amount remained constant, and only the
delay varied. In each of four scans, participants were asked about the
same 26 delays used in the temporal judgments task (i.e., between 14 and
364 d). Again, participants were informed beforehand about the range of
possible delays. The response amount always began at $75 now. Partici-
pants entered their bid by using two buttons to increase or decrease this
amount and a third button to submit their response. The behavioral data
from one scan of one subject in this task was lost due to experimenter
error.
The timing of the two tasks was similar. The intertrial interval was
variable, between 0.5 and 13.5 s. In the “question period,” participants
saw the delay they were judging or the delayed amount they were evalu-
ating but could not yet enter their response. This period lasted from 3 to
5 s. This period terminated with the appearance of the response bar or of
“$75 now” in the respective tasks. The “response period” began at this
point and lasted until the participant submitted their response. The re-
sponse period timed-out after 10 s in both tasks, and the current location
of the response bar or the immediate amount was taken as the partici-
pant’s response.
Participants knew that if they did not press a button to submit their
response, the value that the cursor was on when the 10 s response period
ended would be taken as their response. Participants also knew that there
was nopenalty for not pressing the submit button. Because of this, several
participants adopted a strategy of never pressing the submit button.
Overall, participants did not submit a response within 10 s on 12% of
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Figure 1. Temporal judgment and temporal discounting tasks.A, The sequence of events during a trial in the temporal judgment task is shown. Participants viewed each question for 3–5 s then
were given 10 s to respond. Participants moved a black bar (which always appeared first in the center) along a scale bounded by the labels “very short” and “very long” to indicate their perceived
duration of each delay. When a final response was submitted, the bar turned red and remained on screen for 1 s. B, Plot of subjective time ratings against objective time durations. Gray lines are
individual subjects, and the black line is themean.C, The sequence of events during a trial in the temporal discounting task is shown. Participants viewedeachquestion for 3–5 s andwere thengiven
10 s to respond. Bids for each trial always began at $75, and participants were able to increase and decrease themonetary amount. After pressing a button to submit their response, the text turned
red and remained on the screen for 1 s. D, Plots of bids against objective durations. Gray lines are individual subjects’ bids, and the black line is the mean.
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trials in the temporal judgment task, and on 22%of trials in the temporal
discounting task. However, these “timed-out” trials appeared to be
clearly strategic rather than indicative of an inability to complete the task.
Indeed, the discount rates estimated using all trials and those excluding
timed-out trials were very highly correlated (r(36) 0.998).We therefore
kept all timed-out trials in our analyses.
Only a very small minority of timed-out trials were the result of par-
ticipants not responding on the trial at all. Across both scans, only five
participants had any instance of not moving the cursor along the re-
sponse scale at all; each of these participants made no response on only 1
of a total of 104 trials.
Payments. In addition to a flat $15 per hour fee for their participation,
subjects were paid an additional amount according to their decisions in
the time discounting task, using the mechanism of Becker et al. (1964).
First, participants rolled a die to randomly select one of the trials. The
delayed option on that trial (e.g., $75 in 28 d) and the participant’s bid for
that option (e.g., $70 now) were determined. The participant then rolled
a die a second time to generate a random “counteroffer.” The generation
of counteroffers was such that they would be uniformly distributed be-
tween $0 and $75. If the participant’s bid was greater than the counter-
offer, they received $75 at the delay specified. If the participant’s bid was
below the counteroffer, they received the counteroffer amount immedi-
ately. The payment procedure provides incentive for the participant to
bid their true valuation of the delayed option. All payments were made
using prepaid debit cards, as described previously (Kable and Glimcher,
2007, 2010). These cards have the advantage of making receipt of the
delayed payment easy and reliable, minimizing the effects of greater un-
certainty about and effort needed for the future reward.
Behavioral data analysis. Behavioral data were analyzed in MATLAB
(Mathworks). In the time discounting task, we characterized the rela-
tionship between the objective delay (OT) and the participant’s evalua-
tion of $75 received after that delay (BID). We fit this relationship with
the following function: BID 75/(1 k OT; Mazur, 1987). Because
discount rates are not normally distributed, statistics are performed on
the log-transform of the discount parameter k.
For one subject, this function could not be fit because the subject
always bid $75. This subject is excluded from all analyses and figures,
with one exception. This subject is included in additional analyses that
use an alternativemethod of estimating discount rates, the area under the
curve (AUC) method (Myerson et al., 2001). We report the correlation
between brain activity and discount rates estimated with both the hyper-
bolic k and AUC measures, and observe similar results with both sets of
estimates.
To reduce the influence of possible accidental responses in the time
discounting task, we excluded all trials for any delay where the range of
the subject’s responses spannedmore than half the range of the response
scale (range greater than $37.50). We excluded a total of 12 delay bins in
a total of five subjects (maximum of 4 delay bins per subject,1% of the
data). Our reported results do not differ when these trials are included.
MRI image acquisition. In both sessions, functional and anatomical
images were collected using a 3 T Siemens Trio scanner equippedwith an
eight-channel head coil. T2*-weighted functional images were collected
using an EPI sequence (TR 3 s; TE 30 ms; 45 axial slices, 3 3 3
mm; 64  64 matrix). Each scan consisted of 150–152 images. All par-
ticipants completed four scans in each session. High-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical images were collected using anMPRAGE sequence
(TI 1100ms; 160 axial slices, 0.9375 0.9375 1.000mm; 192 256
matrix).
Imaging data analysis. Functional images were analyzed using VoxBo,
incorporating tools from SPM2. Functional images were first sinc inter-
polated in time to adjust for staggered slice acquisition, corrected for
headmotion by realigning all volumes to the first volume of the scanning
session using six-parameter rigid-body transformations, and detrended
and high-pass filtered (cutoff of 3 cycles/scan, or 0.0066 Hz) to remove
low-frequency drift in the fMRI signal. Images were coregistered with
each subject’s high-resolution anatomical scan andnormalized intoMNI
space. Normalized data were then spatially smoothed (kernel FWHM
9 mm) and thresholded to remove voxels outside of the brain.
Single-subject analyses were performed using the general linearmodel
as implemented in VoxBo. Estimation was by ordinary least squares.
Only the neuroimaging data from the temporal judgments task is dis-
cussed here. The neuroimaging data from the temporal discounting task
will be addressed in a separate report, which we have previously pre-
sented in abstract form (Kable et al., 2011). That report focuses on the
similarities between activation during the bidding task that we used here
and the choice task used in previous studies (Kable and Glimcher, 2007,
2010).
The firstmodel for the temporal judgments task included 15 covariates
of interest. These covariates modeled activity at the following three dif-
ferent time points in the trial: (1) the time at which a trial began and
participants saw the delay to be judged (Qon); (2) the time at which the
response bar appeared and the participant could begin entering the re-
sponse (Ron); and (3) the time at which the participant submitted the
response (Roff). The first 13 regressors divided the Qon periods into
equally sized bins based on the objective delay being judged. Since there
was a small number of trials for each delay (four trials), we combined
consecutive rank-ordered delays (i.e., the four trials from the shortest
delay with the four trials from the second shortest delay, and so on) to
obtain 13 delay bins from the 26 unique objective delays presented. The
last two regressors modeled all of the Ron periods and all of the Roff
periods. All of these covariates were constructed by convolving a delta
function at the time of each event (i.e., only the first 100ms of each event
is modeled) with an empirically estimated hemodynamic response func-
tion. This hemodynamic response function is distributedwith theVoxBo
software package and was empirically estimated by Aguirre et al. (1998)
from motor cortex responses during a motor performance task.
The second model for the temporal judgments task included six cova-
riates of interest: three covariates modeling activity atQon, Ron, and Roff;
and three additional parametric modulator covariates, one at each of
these three time points in the trial. All six regressorsmodeled the first 100
ms of each event. The first three covariates were constructed by convolv-
ing a delta function at the time of each event with an empirically esti-
mated hemodynamic response function (Aguirre et al., 1998). These first
three covariates fit the mean activity at a given point in a trial, across all
trials. The parametric modulator was the OT being judged on that trial.
These values were all mean centered and then convolved with the hemo-
dynamic response, so the parametric modulator covariates fit the devia-
tions from mean activity that were correlated with the objective delay
across trials.
Region of interest analysis. We used regions of interest (ROIs) from
Bartra et al. (2013). This is a quantitative meta-analysis of studies that
report value-related neural signals during decision making. The regions
of interest used herewere defined froman analysis of 27 studies reporting
subjective value effects (i.e., increased BOLD signal for increasingly valu-
able rewards) at the time when subjects were evaluating the available
choice options. Regions of interest in bilateral ventral striatum and ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex defined by this contrast are available for
download (http://www.sas.upenn.edu/mcguirej/meta-analysis.html).
Slight differences in the downloadablemasks and themasks used here are
due to the downsampling process from 2 to 3mm voxel sizes. The result-
ing regions are bilateral ventral striatum (300 voxels at 3  3  3 mm,
centered on MNI coordinates 6, 8, and 4 on the left, and 6, 10, and
8 on the right) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (609 voxels at 3
3 3mm, centered onMNI coordinates2, 40, and8). The regions of
interest used are shown in Figure 2.
Results
On each trial of the temporal judgment task, participants indi-
cated their perceived duration of a future delay on a visual analog
scale (Fig. 1A). Delays ranged from 14 to 364 d. In the temporal
discounting task, participants indicated how much they valued a
delayed gain of $75 (Fig. 1C). The delays were identical to those
used in the temporal judgment task. For each subject, we fit the
relationship between objective time and the person’s valuation
with the following function: BID 75/(1 kOT), to estimate
each subject’s k value.
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Our analyses concentrated on the link between neural re-
sponses in the temporal judgment task and delay discount rates as
measured in the temporal discounting task 10 d later. Previous
studies of intertemporal choice have identified correlates of sub-
jective value during decisionmaking in ventral striatum and ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010;
Peters andBu¨chel, 2009, 2010b).Wedefined regions of interest in
the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex based on
a quantitative meta-analysis that examined subjective value cor-
relates during decision making (Bartra et al., 2013).
We used two different approaches to examine the link be-
tween neural sensitivity to delay in the time judgment task and
behavior on the time discounting task. In both cases, we looked at
the neural response in the temporal judgment task at the time
when the participant first saw the future duration to be judged on
that trial, before they could enter their response (Qon). First, we
split participants at the median k value into two groups of high
(n  20) and low (n  19) discounters. In both ROIs, we esti-
mated the BOLD activity in the two groups atQon as a function of
the delay being judged (delays were divided into 13 bins). High
discounters showed a higher response in both ventral striatum
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex to short delay periods that
decreased as delay lengths increased (Fig. 2). Low discounters
showed the opposite pattern, with responses increasing from
short delays to long delays (Fig. 2). The estimated slopes of indi-
vidual subjects in the high and low discounting groups are signif-
icantly different (VS, p 0.0026, two-tailed t test; VMPFC, p
0.037, two-tailed t test).
Our second approach looked at this same effect in a continu-
ous rather than categorical manner. For each subject, we esti-
mated the neural sensitivity to delay in both regions in the
temporal judgment task. We modeled the objective delay as a
parametric modulator in the temporal judgment task and took
the -coefficient on this parameter as our estimate of neural
sensitivity. This provides a measure of how activity in these re-
gions changes as a function of delay in the temporal judgment
task; for example, whether activity increases or decreases as the
delay judged gets longer, and how strongly it does so, in each
subject. We then related this neural sensitivity to delay (from the
temporal judgment task) to individual discount rates (from the
behavioral measures in the time discounting task). Delay dis-
count rates were negatively correlated with neural delay sensitiv-
ities. There was a significant linear relationship between discount
rates and neural response to objective duration during the
temporal judgment task in both regions (ventral striatum:
r(37)0.42, p 0.0076; ventromedial prefrontal cortex: r(37)
0.35, p  0.0294; see Figure 3). Using the AUC estimation of
discount rates, which allows us to include all participants, this
relationship is just as strong (ventral striatum: r(38)  0.44, p 
0.0049; ventromedial prefrontal cortex: r(38) 0.34, p 0.0314;
note that larger AUC corresponds to less discounting). Higher
discounters showed an increasingly negative relationship be-
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Figure2. BOLDactivity during the temporal judgment task differentiates high and lowdiscounters.A, C, Region of interest encompassing ventral striatum (A) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(C), identified from previous meta-analysis (Bartra et al., 2013). B, D, BOLD activity in the ventral striatum (B) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (D) ROIs at question onset during the temporal
judgments task is plotted based on the length of delay being judged on that trial (26 delay lengths represented in 13 bins). Participants are divided at themedian into high (n 20) and low (n
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tween BOLD activity and objective dura-
tions, while lower discounters had an
increasingly positive relationship.
These data show that neural delay sen-
sitivity can account for15% of the vari-
ance in discount rates. Given recent
concerns regarding the interpretation of
effect sizes in imaging experiments (Vul et
al., 2009), we hasten to add that the effect
sizes we estimated here are unbiased and
not artificially inflated, because we care-
fully identified valuation regions a priori,
based on separate data entirely. Indeed,
estimating the same brain–behavior rela-
tionship in a circular manner, by using
only those voxels in ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex and ventral striatum that
show a significant across-subjects correla-
tion, results in inflated effect size esti-
mates (ventral striatum: r(37)0.51, p 0.0008; ventromedial
prefrontal cortex: r(37)0.51, p 0.0009).
Discussion
We scanned 40 people while they made judgments about the
perceived length of future time durations and found that brain
activity during this outcome-free task was predictive of how the
same individuals discounted future monetary rewards. We iden-
tified regions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral stria-
tum where activity consistently scaled with subjective value in
previous fMRI studies of decision making, and measured the
delay sensitivity of these regions during the temporal judgment
task. This neural sensitivity to time delays was negatively corre-
lated with discount rates measured 10 d later. Steep discounters
tended to have larger neural responses when judging short delays
than when judging long delays, while shallow discounters tended
to have the opposite pattern. Our results show that prompting
someone to think about the future, in a fairly minimal manner
with no mention of outcomes, elicits brain activity that predicts
discount rates. These results suggest that individual differences in
the propensity to delay gratification derive from differences in
basic cognitive and neural processes engaged when one thinks
about the future, rather than, or in addition to, an individual’s
drive toward immediate rewards and/or their ability to control
that drive.
Our study builds on previous work in several ways. First, we
identified regions involved in valuation a priori. This is critical to
the claim that temporal judgments elicit activity in the same re-
gions as decision making, since there is heterogeneity within val-
uation regions, and in general nearby anatomical regions can be
implicated in different cognitive processes (Kable, 2011; Pol-
drack, 2011). Second,wemeasured the sensitivity of these regions
to parametrically varying delays. This allowed us to determine
that activity differences between individuals are not solely due to
the response of these regions to the immediate present, but in-
stead involve how activity in these regions varies as people con-
sider intervals that extend farther into the future. Third, our
temporal judgment task did not involve explicit choices, evalua-
tion of rewards or future scenarios, or judgments of self-
relevance. The simplicity of our task allows us to show that even
very basic judgments about the future are sufficient to elicit brain
activity in valuation regions that predict discount rates.
Our findings leave open the exact nature of the cognitive pro-
cesses that mediate this link. The neural processes of temporal
judgment and reward valuation could be directly or indirectly
linked, in several ways. One possibility is that judging prospective
future durations itself activates ventromedial prefrontal cortex
and ventral striatum, and that the activity we observe does not
explicitly or implicitly reflect valuations. Under this account,
neural activity is predictive because the perception of future du-
rations predicts discount rates. Alternatively, since the waiting
duration is a necessary input for evaluating delayed rewards,
judgments of future durations may be sufficient to elicit value-
related neural activity, as an epiphenomenon. Another possibility
is that evaluative processes are critically involved in the judgment
of prospective future durations. People might directly use their
evaluation of future reward as a cue for judging the length of a
future duration. Or, they might imagine a specific future event
when judging duration. Cues in the simulated future eventmight
be used to judge temporal distance, and the same simulated event
might also be automatically evaluated.
Of course, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and
the implicated cognitive processes are highly intertwined. Tem-
poral estimates are an important factor in the evaluation of de-
layed rewards, and a major reason for simulating different
possible futures is to evaluate whether these are desirable or not
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). More than one of these cognitive
processes might drive activation in ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex and ventral striatum, and these different processes may be
instances of a more general function performed by these brain
areas. Future experimentsmight use techniques that can separate
neural signals that overlap spatially (e.g., adaptation or multi-
voxel pattern analysis) to tease apart the component processes in
this network.
Regardless of the details of the link, our results demonstrate
that outcome-free temporal judgments and temporal discount-
ing of rewards share neural processes, as would be predicted by
theories that attribute some features of discounting and impul-
sivity more generally to properties of temporal perception (Wit-
tmann and Paulus, 2008; Wittmann et al., 2011). Some of our
previous work has focused on how the curvature of time percep-
tion can affect the shape of the discount function (Zauberman et
al., 2009).We did not observe a similar relationship in these data,
perhaps because of the smaller sample size or larger time lag
between the two tasks. In contrast, these data call attention to
another link we have explored recently, between the magnitude
of a temporal perception and the extent of discounting (Kim and
Zauberman, 2009, 2013). Given that the absolute perceivedmag-
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Figure 3. Individual neural delay sensitivities during temporal judgment predict delay discount rates. Individual discount rates
(log scale) calculated frombehavior on the temporal judgment task are plotted against individual neural delay sensitivity, or the fit
of aparametric objective timemodulator toneural activity in the temporal judgments task.A,B, This is plotted for activity in ventral
striatum (A) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (B). Dotted line is the linear trendline.
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nitude is difficult to measure behaviorally, because it can be con-
founded with scale use, the individual differences in neural delay
sensitivities discovered heremight provide a useful tool in further
exploring this relationship.
Previous work has shown that discount rates vary widely
across individuals, and that these differences are relatively stable
across time (Ohmura et al., 2006; Kirby, 2009; Senecal et al.,
2012). Despite this intraindividual reliability, there are surpris-
ingly few reliable predictors of discount rates. Perhaps the stron-
gest is cognitive ability, which is reliably associated with discount
rates with an effect size of approximately r  0.20 (Shamosh
and Gray, 2008; Burks et al., 2009). The relationship between
discount rates and self-reported personality traits is usually
smaller than this. In this context, the 15% of the variance in
discount rates that can be accounted for by neural delay sensitiv-
ities is a sizable and important effect. These data show that, avoid-
ing the previously described bias from circular estimates (Vul et
al., 2009), the correlations between BOLD activity and individual
differences in behavior can be comparable to or even outperform
those of standard psychometric variables.
Our results also have implications for how to enhance patient,
future-oriented behavior. Much work has concentrated on the
hypothesis that lateral prefrontal cortex promotes patient
choices, and that (correspondingly) such choices require a
greater degree of cognitive control (McClure et al., 2004; Hare et
al., 2009; Figner et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2012). Some have addi-
tionally proposed that lateral prefrontal cortex acts in opposition
to ventromedial prefrontal and ventral striatal regions, and that
suppressing activity in these two regions promotes patient behav-
ior. In contrast, our results show that patient individuals show a
different pattern of activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
ventral striatum, rather than reduced activity in these regions
altogether. Shallower discounters showed greater activity in ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum when consider-
ing durations lasting farther into the future. This suggests that
patient behavior might be promoted by enhancing activity in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum in response
to future outcomes, relative to that for immediate outcomes. This
proposal is consistent with several recent studies showing that
medial prefrontal BOLD activity predicts the effectiveness of
messages promoting future-oriented behavior (Falk et al., 2010;
Chua et al., 2011). Given that ventromedial prefrontal cortex has
been linked to a “prospective brain network” that simulates the
future (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Gilbert and Wilson, 2007;
Schacter et al., 2007) and to predicting the subjective value of
different possible actions during decision making (Kable and
Glimcher, 2009; Rangel and Hare, 2010), these neural findings
may suggest novel psychological interventions to promote the
delay of gratification.
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